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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APPELLATE CASE NO. 20040265-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
The opinion in Young Electric Sign Company, Inc. v. Utah Dept of Transp., 2005 
UT App 169, mistakenly relies upon a different version of Utah Admin. Code R933-2-
3(2) than the rule at issue in the proceedings below. Further, the Court has 
misapprehended the fact that the claimed "point of widening" in this case does not "begin 
to parallel" other lanes of traffic at the location in question. A picture taken by Appellant 
Young Electric Sign Company ("YESCO") demonstrating this fact is attached hereto as 
Addendum B. As a result of the opinion, the Department of Transportation ("UDOT") is 
left with an unworkable standard that, in this case at least, uses interchange measurement 
in conflict with the Utah Federal Agreement concerning outdoor advertising, the Highway 
Beautification Act, 23 U.S.C. § 131, particularly subsections (h) and (r) therein, and the 
national standards promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation, 23 C.F.R. Part 750. 
In light of its errors, should the Young opinion be withdrawn and further oral 
argument granted? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L THE COURT'S OPINION IS BASED IN PART ON THE NEW 
RULE THAT WAS NOT EFFECT IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
BELOW, 
The Court's opinion relies in part upon the new definition of "acceleration and 
deceleration lanes" in Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3(2), rather than the old rule, which 
was in effect in the proceedings below. Young Electric Sign Company, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of 
Transp., 2005 UT App 169 f 11 and Addendum A hereto. The old rule did not include the 
last sentence which states: "On ramps and off-ramps are part of the interchange and shall 
not be considered an acceleration or deceleration lane under the Act or these rules." This 
change became effective in March 2004. 
One purpose for this rule change was to clarify Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(9). 
The change was adopted in response to the argument that YESCO made in the district 
court that large portions of the on-ramp could somehow be excluded from the interchange 
for purposes of outdoor advertising control. Without the rule clarification, UDOT 
maintains the old definition would have placed the state in violation of 23 C.F.R. 
§750.707 and the Utah-Federal Agreement by allowing the movement of non-conforming 
signs. 
2 
POINT II. THE INTERSECTING LANE DOES NOT "BEGIN TO 
PARALLEL" THE OTHER LANES OF TRAFFIC AT THIS 
LOCATION - THE RESULT IS AN UNWORKABLE 
STANDARD FOR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
REGULATION. 
The Court also mistakenly states that the Antelope Drive on-ramp "begins to 
parallel 1-15" when, in point of fact, it does not. Young, at ^ 13 (emphasis added). See 
Exhibit 2, Photos 1 and 2, attached to October 22, 2002 letter from M. Short to UDOT 
Hearing Officer D. Miles (attached hereto as Addendum B (relevant photograph) and 
Addendum D (complete letter with all original attachments)).1 As the Court can see from 
Addendum B, this intersecting lane plainly does not "begin[] to parallel the other lanes of 
traffic' at this point. See Utah Code Ann § 72-7-502(19). 
UDOT's postion is that this intersecting lane (the Antelope Drive on-ramp) begins 
to parallel other lanes of traffic at the location that UDOT and the court below have 
described as the "point of pavement widening/' The Court's factual error2 creates and 
unworkable standard making it impossible for the Department to determine where so-
called parallel lanes, that are not truly parallel, begin in other on-ramps. 
To the extent that Legislature's 2,640 foot limitation in Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
502(19) or exclusion of acceleration lanes requires a different result, those provisions are 
superceded by the standard for measuring interchanges set forth in the Utah-Federal 
1
 Exhibit 1 from the same letter was included as Addendum A in Appellant's Brief. 
2It appears this error was based in part on Appellant's representation at page 18 of 
its intial brief. 
3 
Agreement. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-515(2)("The provisions of this part are subject 
to and shall be superseded by conflicting provisions of the Utah-Federal Agreement."); 
Utah Admin. Code R933-5-2 (incorporating the Utah-Federal Agreement, Section 
III.A.2.(b) ("No sign may be located on an interstate highway or freeway within 500 feet 
of an interchange, or intersection at grade, or rest area (measured along the interstate 
highway or freeway from the sign to the nearest point of the beginning or ending of 
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way). It is notable 
that this standard requires that the measurement begin at the sign to determine the nearest 
pavement widening created by an on-ramp or off-ramp. 
CONCLUSION AND CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH 
For the foregoing reasons, UDOT respectfully requests that the Court take these 
legal and factual errors into account, grant its Petition for Rehearing and set the case for 
further argument, or revise its opinion accordingly. 
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 35(a), counsel for UDOT certifies that this petition is 
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of April, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
MARK E. BURNS 
Assistant Attorney General 
4 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR 
REHEARING was mailed this 28th day of April, 2005 to: 
HEIDI E. C. LEITHEAD 
PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE & LOVELESS 
185 S STATE ST STE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
5 
ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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Young Electric Sign Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
State of Utah, by and through 
the Utah Department of 
Transportation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
'For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20040265-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 4 , 2005 ) 
2005 UT App 169 
Second District, Farmington Department 
The Honorable Darwin C. Hansen 
Attorneys: Heidi E. Leithead, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Mark E. Burns, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Jackson. 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
fl Plaintiff Young Electric Sign Company (Young) appeals the 
trial court's order denying its motion for summary judgment and 
granting the Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) cross-
motion for summary judgment. Specifically, Young argues that the 
trial court erred by upholding UDOT's denial of Young's 
application to erect an outdoor advertising sign. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
\2 In 1978, Young erected an outdoor advertising sign on 
premises leased from the owner of real property located in 
Clearfield, Utah, adjacent to Interstate 15 (1-15). Sometime 
thereafter, UDOT constructed a freeway interchange nearby to 
allow traffic on Antelope Drive to enter and exit 1-15 north of 
Antelope Drive. 
%3 In 2002, the property owner informed Young that it needed to 
move the sign to the north end of the property in order to 
accommodate development plans for the property. Young removed 
the original sign and submitted an application to UDOT to locate 
a new sign further north on the east side of 1-15, north of 
Antelope Drive. After reviewing the application, UDOT concluded 
that the proposed sign location was within 500 feet of the 
interchange in violation of Utah Code section 72-7-
505(3) (c) (i) (A) . See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3) (c) (i) (A) 
(Supp. 2004). In particular, UDOT found that the proposed sign 
location is 108 feet from the "point of the . . . ending of 
pavement widening at the . . . entrance to the main-traveled 
way." Id. Accordingly, UDOT denied Young's permit application. 
f4 Pursuant to Utah Code section 72-7-508(4), Young filed a 
complaint in Second District Court seeking de novo judicial 
review of UDOT's decision. See id. § 72-7-508(4) (Supp. 2004). 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court upheld 
UDOT's decision. Young appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f5 Young argues that, in its ruling, which granted UDOT's 
motion for summary judgment and denied Young's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court erroneously interpreted various 
provisions in the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act (the Act). See 
id. §§ 72-7-501 to -516 (2001 & Supp. 2004). "We review 
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness, affording 
no deference to the district court's legal conclusions." R.A. 
McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Farcro Bank, N.A. , 2004 UT 48,1(7, 
100 P.3d 1159. Furthermore, "[i]n the context of a summary 
judgment motion, we likewise employ a correctness standard and 
'view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party.'" Id. (quoting 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52,1|l0, 48 P.3d 235). 
ANALYSIS 
f6 The Act prohibits outdoor advertising signs within 500 feet 
of an interchange. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3) (c) (i) (A) . 
The Act specifically provides, in relevant part, that 
signs may not be located on an interstate 
highway or limited access highway on the 
primary system within 500 feet of an 
interchange . . . measured along the 
interstate highway or freeway from the sign 
to the nearest point of the beginning or 
ending of pavement widening at the exit from 
or entrance to the main-traveled way. 
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Id. The Act defines "[i]nterchange" to "mean[] those areas and 
their approaches where traffic is channeled off or onto an 
interstate route, excluding the deceleration lanes, acceleration 
lanes, or feeder systems, from or to another federal, state, 
county, city, or other route." Id. § 72-7-502(9). In addition, 
the Act defines the "[p]oint of widening" as "the point of the 
gore or the point where the intersecting lane begins to parallel 
the other lanes of traffic, but the point of widening may never 
be greater than 2,640 feet from the center line of the 
intersecting highway of the interchange." Id. § 72-7-502(19). 
%1 UDOT argues that the "point of widening" defined in section 
72-7-502(19) is not synonymous with the "point of the beginning 
or ending of pavement widening" as used in section 72-7-
505(3) (c) (i) (A) . IcL §§ 72-7-502 (19) , -5 05 (3) (c) (i) (A) . 
However, this interpretation renders the definition in section 
72-7-502(19) meaningless. When construing statutes, we assume 
that the legislature used each term in the statute or its 
amendments advisedly; "thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable." Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 913 P.2d 723, 727 
(Utah 1995) (quotations and citation omitted). Because the exact 
phrase "point of widening" is not used anywhere in the Utah Code 
or the Utah Administrative Code, and variations of the phrase 
"point of pavement widening" are used in both the Utah Code1 and 
the Utah Administrative Code,2 we interpret the phrases as 
synonymous. 
f8 While the district court noted the applicability of section 
72-7-502(19), it failed to properly apply it. In the court's 
summary judgement ruling, it stated that under Utah Code section 
72-7-502(19), the "point of widening" is defined as "either (1) 
1
 the point of the gore' in the case where there is no 
acceleration lane, or (2) 'the point where the intersecting lane 
begins to parallel the other lanes of traffic' where there is an 
acceleration lane that does run parallel to the main-traveled 
way." (Footnotes omitted) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
502(19)). 
1. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A) (Supp. 2004) 
(stating that the placement of advertising signs are to be 
"measured along the interstate highway or freeway from the sign 
to the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement 
widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way") 
(emphasis added); id. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(ii) (same). 
2. See Utah Admin. Code R933-2-12 (using phrase "nearest point 
of pavement widening"); id. R933-2-13 (same); id. R933-2-3 (using 
the phrase "nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement 
widening"); id. R933-5-2 (same). 
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^9 We agree with the district court that in places where there 
is no acceleration lane and the interchange on-ramp immediately 
"dies into the freeway," the "point of widening" occurs at the 
"point of the gore."3 In other words, the point of widening is 
where the on-ramp lane physically merges into the main-traveled 
way. We also agree that in places where there exists an 
acceleration lane, "the point where the intersecting lane begins 
to parallel the other lanes of traffic" constitutes the "point of 
widening." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(19). However, because by 
definition, "the point of widening may never be greater than 
2,640 feet from the center line of the intersecting highway of 
the interchange," id., the district court erred by ruling that 
the point of widening occurs 2,937 feet from the center line of 
Antelope Drive.4 
iJlO UDOT argues, and the district court apparently concluded, 
that there is no acceleration lane at this location and thus the 
point of the gore, or the point of widening, occurs when the lane 
proceeding northbound from Antelope Drive completely merges with 
1-15. Young contends that an acceleration lane does exist at 
this location and thus the point of widening occurs when the lane 
from Antelope Drive begins to parallel the other lanes of 1-15. 
Accordingly, we must determine whether an acceleration lane 
exists in this case. 
3. Black's Law Dictionary defines "gore" as either (1) "[a] 
small, narrow slip of land" or (2) " [a] small (often triangular) 
piece of land, such as may be left between surveys that do not 
close." Black's Law Dictionary 703 (7th ed. 1999). 
4. UDOT claims that our enforcement of the 2,640-foot limit, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(19) (Supp. 2004), is contrary to the 
Utah-Federal Agreement entered into between the governor of Utah 
and the secretary of the United States Department of 
Transportation's Federal Highway Administrator on January 18, 
1968, pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act of 1965. See 23 
U.S.C. § 131 (2005); Utah Admin. Code R933-5-2; see also Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 72-7-501 to -516. We disagree. The core confusion 
rather stems from where the analysis of section 72-7-
505(3)(c)(i)(A) begins. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
505(3)(c)(1)(A). UDOT begins the analysis at the sign and then 
goes counter to traffic flow to find an "ending of pavement 
widening." Id. We conclude that this defeats the purpose of the 
Act, which is to protect the 500-foot area around an interchange 
from advertising signs. We think Young's analysis, which begins 
the application of the various statutory definitions from the 
interchange at issue, better accomplishes the purpose of the Act. 
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fll The Utah Code does not define "acceleration lane." However, 
the Utah Administrative Code defines "acceleration and 
deceleration lanes" as 
speed change lanes created for the purpose of 
enabling a vehicle to increase or decrease 
its speed to merge into, or out of, traffic 
on the main-traveled way. As used in the 
Act, an acceleration or deceleration lane 
begins and ends at a point no closer than 5 00 
feet from the nearest point of the beginning 
or ending of pavement widening at the exit 
from or entrance to the main-traveled way. 
On-ramps and off-ramps are part of the 
interchange and shall not be considered an 
acceleration or deceleration lane under the 
Act or these rules. 
Utah Admin. Code R933-2-3. Thus, an acceleration lane is a lane 
constructed for the purpose of allowing a vehicle to increase its 
speed to equal that of the traffic on the main-traveled way. 
Ul2 UDOT would like us to assume that acceleration and 
deceleration lanes occur only when there is a lane that travels 
from an on-ramp to the next off-ramp without ever merging into 
traffic on the main-traveled way. However, in the traffic rules 
and regulations chapter of the Utah Code, the legislature has 
defined this type of lane as an "auxiliary lane" not as an 
"acceleration or deceleration lane." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
53.5(1) (b) (Supp. 2004) (stating that a "general purpose lane" 
does not include an "auxiliary lane that begins as a freeway on-
ramp and ends as part of the next freeway off-ramp"). Further, 
the Act also distinguishes between "auxiliary lanes" and 
"acceleration lanes [and] deceleration lanes." Id. § 72-7-
502(12) (defining "[m]ain-traveled way" as "the through traffic 
lanes, including auxiliary lanes, acceleration lanes, 
deceleration lanes, and feeder systems, exclusive of frontage 
roads and ramps"). Thus, the Act does not support UDOT's 
interpretation. Therefore, because in this case there exists a 
lane that meets the northbound lanes of 1-15 and then continues 
on for 1,738 feet before finally merging into the outside lane of 
1-15, its purpose must be to allow vehicles to increase their 
speed to merge with 1-15 traffic. Accordingly, we hold that an 
acceleration lane exists at this location.5 
5. We also note that there are some locations where a freeway 
on-ramp does not convert into an acceleration lane. In these 
situations, the on-ramp immediately merges into the other lanes 
of traffic and the point of widening occurs at the "point of the 
(continued...) 
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fl3 The acceleration lane in this case begins at the point of 
widening, or the point where the Antelope Drive on-ramp begins to 
parallel 1-15, and extends 500 feet. See Utah Admin. Code R933-
2-3 ("As used in the Act, an acceleration or deceleration lane 
begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from the 
nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at 
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way."). Because 
an acceleration or deceleration lane is not, by definition, 
considered a part of the interchange, see Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-
502(9) (defining interchange as "those areas and approaches where 
traffic is channeled off or onto an interstate route, excluding 
the deceleration lanes, acceleration lanes, or feeder systems, 
from or to another . . . route" (emphasis added)), in this case 
the Act prohibits advertising signs within 500 feet from the 
point of widening. See id. § 72-7-505(3)(c)(i)(A). Accordingly, 
Young's proposed sign location is permissible under the Act as it 
is 846 feet beyond this point. 
CONCLUSION 
fl4 We hold that the district court erred by granting summary 
judgment to UDOT and denying Young's motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, we reverse. 
Judith M. Billinqs, v Judit g
Presiding Judge 
Hi5 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Norman H 
5. (...continued) 
gore." Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-502(19) (Supp. 2004). That, 
however, is not the situation in this case as there exists an 
acceleration lane as defined by the Utah Administrative Code. 
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NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE 
(Amendment) 
DAR FILE No.: 26893 
FILED: 01/14/2004, 13:49 
RULE ANALYSIS 
PURPOSE OF THE RULE OR REASON FOR THE CHANGE: This rule 
amendment is designed to make the definitions comply with 
federal law. 
SUMMARY OF THE RULE OR CHANGE: The amendment clarifies 
the definition of acceleration-deceleration lane, adds a 
definition for feeder system, and deletes the definition for "out-
of-standard." (DAR NOTE: A corresponding 120-day 
(emergency) rule that is effective as of January 14, 2004, is 
under DAR No. 26892 in this issue.) 
STATE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS 
RULE: Section 72-2-501; and 23 CFR 750.707 
ANTICIPATED COST OR SAVINGS TO: 
• THE STATE BUDGET: The state does not anticipate any cost 
increase or savings to the state from this change because it 
does not require any different activity on the part of the state 
than the state currently does. 
• LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: The rule does not apply to local 
governments; therefore, there are no costs or savings that 
accrue to them. 
• OTHER PERSONS: No costs or savings are anticipated to 
result from the rule amendment because it does not require 
any person to undertake any activity or change the 
responsibilities they currently have. 
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR AFFECTED PERSONS: There would be no 
compliance costs because the rule change does not require 
anyone to do anything differently than they are doing now. 
Since no one is required to undertake any new activity, there 
should be no increase in costs. 
COMMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT HEAD ON THE FISCAL IMPACT THE 
RULE MAY HAVE ON BUSINESSES: Because there are no costs as 
a result of the rule change, there is no fiscal impact 
THE FULL TEXT OF THIS RULE MAY BE INSPECTED, DURING REGULAR 
BUSINESS HOURS, AT: 
TRANSPORTATION 
PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT-OF-WAY ACQUISITION 
CALVIN L RAMPTON COMPLEX 
4501 S 2700 W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84119-5998, or 
at the Division of Administrative Rules. 
DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS RULE TO: 
James Beadles at the above address, by phone at 801-965-
4168, by FAX at 801-965-4796, or by Internet E-mail at 
jbeadles@utah.gov 
INTERESTED PERSONS MAY PRESENT THEIR VIEWS ON THIS RULE BY 
SUBMITTING WRITTEN COMMENTS TO THE ADDRESS ABOVE NO LATER 
THAN 5.00 PM on 03/16/2004. 
THIS RULE MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE ON: 03/17/2004 
AUTHORIZED BY: John R. Njord, Executive Director 
R933. Transportation, Preconstruction, Right-of-Way Acquisition. 
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs. 
R933-2-3. Definitions. 
All references in these Rules to Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5, are 
to those sections of the Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act. In addition to the definitions in that part, the 
following definitions are supplied: 
(1) "Abandoned Sign" means any controlled sign, the sign 
facing of which has been partially obliterated, has been painted out, 
has remained blank or has obsolete advertising matter for a 
continuous period of 12 months or more. 
(2) "Acceleration and deceleration lanes" means speed change 
lanes created for the purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase or 
decrease its speed to merge into, or out of, traffic on the main-
traveled way. As used in the Act, an acceleration or deceleration 
lane begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from the 
nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the 
exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way. On-ramps and off-
ramps are part of the interchange and shall not be considered an 
acceleration or deceleration lane under the Act or these rules. 
(3) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
(4) "Advertising" means any message, whether in words, 
symbols, pictures or any combination thereof, painted or otherwise 
applied to the face of an outdoor advertising structure, which 
message is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, and 
which message is visible from any place on the main travel-way of 
the interstate or primary highway system. 
(5) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of outdoor 
advertising" as used in the Act is defined to include areas in which 
the primary activity is outdoor advertising. 
(6) "Commercial or industrial zone" as defined in of the Act is 
further defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside the 
boundaries of urbanized counties and outside the boundaries of cities 
and towns referred to in that subsection, those areas not within 8,420 
feet of an interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as 
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NOTICES OF 
120-DAY (EMERGENCY) RULES 
An agency may file a 120-DAY (EMERGENCY) RULE when it finds that the regular rulemaking procedures would: 
(a) cause an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare; 
(b) cause an imminent budget reduction because of budget restraints or federal requirements; or 
(c) place the agency in violation of federal or state law (Utah Code Subsection 63-46a-7(1) (2001)). 
As with a PROPOSED RULE, a 120-DAY RULE is preceded by a RULE ANALYSIS. This analysis provides summary 
information about the 1 20-DAY RULE including the name of a contact person, justification for filing a 1 20-DAY RULE, 
anticipated cost impact of the rule, and legal cross-references. A row of dots in the text ( ) indicates that 
unaffected text was removed to conserve space. 
A1 20-DAY RULE is effective at the moment the Division of Administrative Rules receives the filing, or on a later date 
designated by the agency. A 120-DAY RULE is effective for 120 days or until it is superseded by a permanent rule. 
Because 120-DAY RULES are effective immediately, the law does not require a public comment period. However, 
when an agency files a 1 20-DAY RULE, it usually files a PROPOSED RULE at the same time, to make the requirements 
permanent. Comment may be made on the proposed rule. Emergency or 120-DAY RULES are governed by Utah 





NOTICE OF 120-DAY (EMERGENCY) RULE 
D A R F I L E N O . : 26892 
FILED: 01/14/2004, 13:38 
RULE ANALYSIS 
PURPOSE OF THE RULE OR REASON FOR THE CHANGE: Section 
R933-2-3 is the definitional section of the rule regarding the 
regulation of outdoor advertising. The amendment to the 
section is designed to take care of a conflict with federal law. 
SUMMARY OF THE RULE OR CHANGE: The rule change adds a 
clarification to the definition of acceleration-deceleration lanes, 
a definition of feeder system, and deletes the definition of 
"out-of-standard." (DAR NOTE: A corresponding proposed 
amendment is under DAR No. 26893 in this issue.) 
STATE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS 
RULE: Section 72-7-501; and 23 CFR 750.707 
ANTICIPATED COST OR SAVINGS TO: 
• THE STATE BUDGET: The state does not anticipate any cost or 
savings to the state from this change because it does not 
require any different activity on the part of the state than the 
state currently does now. 
• LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: The rule does not apply to local 
governments, so no cost or savings to them is anticipated. 
• OTHER PERSONS: None of the changes to the rule require 
any cost, or provide for any savings, to other persons. The 
changes do not require any persons to undertake any 
activities that they are not now carrying out, so there is no 
change in cost or savings. 
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR AFFECTED PERSONS: There would be no 
compliance costs because the rule change does not require 
anyone to do anything. Since no one is required to undertake 
any activity different than what they now undertake, there 
should be no increase in costs. 
COMMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT HEAD ON THE FISCAL IMPACT THE 
RULE MAY HAVE ON BUSINESSES: There is no fiscal impact on 
business. 
EMERGENCY RULE REASON AND JUSTIFICATION: REGULAR 
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES WOULD place the agency in violation 
of federal or state law. 
The Utah-Federal agreement does not allow for "out-of-
standard" signs. 
THE FULL TEXT OF THIS RULE MAY BE INSPECTED, DURING REGULAR 
BUSINESS HOURS, AT: 
TRANSPORTATION 
PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT-OF-WAY ACQUISITION 
CALVIN L RAMPTON COMPLEX 
4501 S2700W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84119-5998, or 
at the Division of Administrative Rules. 
DIRECT QUESTIONS REGARDING THIS RULE TO: 
James Beadles at the above address, by phone at 801-965-
4168, by FAX at 801-965-4796, or by Internet E-mail at 
jbeadles@utah.gov 
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THIS RULE IS EFFECTIVE ON: 01/14/2004 
AUTHORIZED BY: John R. Njord, Executive Director 
R933. Transportation, Preconstruction, Right-of-Way Acquisition. 
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs. 
R933-2-3. Definitions. 
All references in these Rules to Title 72, Chapter 7, Part 5, are 
to those sections of the Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor 
Advertising Act. In addition to the definitions in that part, the 
following definitions are supplied: 
(1) "Abandoned Sign" means any controlled sign, the sign 
facing of which has been partially obliterated, has been painted out, 
has remained blank or has obsolete advertising matter for a 
continuous period of 12 months or more. 
(2) "Acceleration and deceleration lanes" means speed change 
lanes created for the purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase or 
decrease its speed to merge into, or out of, traffic on the main-
traveled way. As used in the Act, an acceleration or deceleration 
lane begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from the 
nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the 
exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way. On-ramps and off-
ramps are part of the interchange and shall not be considered an 
acceleration or deceleration lane under the Act or these rules. 
(3) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act 
(4) "Advertising" means any message, whether in words, 
symbols, pictures or any combination thereof, painted or otherwise 
applied to the face of an outdoor advertising structure, which 
message is designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, and 
which message is visible from any place on the main travel-way of 
the interstate or primary highway system. 
(5) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of outdoor 
advertising" as used in the Act is defined to include areas in which 
the primary activity is outdoor advertising. 
(6) "Commercial or industrial zone" as defined in of the Act is 
further defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside the 
boundaries of urbanized counties and outside the boundaries of cities 
and towns referred to in that subsection, those areas not within 8,420 
feet of an interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as 
measured from the nearest point of the beginning or ending of the 
pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main traveled 
way mat are reserved for business, commerce, or trade under 
enabling state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordinances 
or regulations, and are actually used for commercial or industrial 
purposes, including the land along both sides of a controlled 
highway for 600 feet immediately abutting the area of use, 
measurements under this subsection being made from the outer edge 
of regularly used buildings, parking lots, gate-houses, entrance 
gates, or storage or processing areas. 
(7) "Conforming Sign" means an off-premise sign maintained 
in a location that conforms to the size, lighting, spacing, zoning and 
usage requirements as provided by law and these rules. 
(8) "Controlled Sign" means any off-premise sign that is 
designed, intended, or used to advertise or inform any part of the 
advertising or informative contents of which is visible from any 
place on the main traveled way of any interstate or federal-aid 
primary highway in this State. 
(9) "Destroyed Sign" means a sign damaged by natural 
elements wherein the costs of re-erection exceeds 30% of the 
depreciated value of the sign as established by departmental 
appraisal methods. 
(10) "Feeder systems" are secondary roads that bring traffic to 
the main-traveled way. 
[(4£)](11) "Freeway" means a divided highway for through 
traffic with full control access. 
f(-W](T2) "Grandfather Status" refers to any off-premise 
controlled sign erected in zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial 
areas, prior to May 9, 1967, even if the sign does not comply with 
the size, lighting, or spacing of the Act and these Rules. Signs only, 
and not sign sites, may qualify for Grandfather Status. 
[f!2)}(T3) "H-l" means highway service zone as defined in the 
Act. 
[(L3)]Q4}MLease or Consent" means any written agreement by 
which possession of land, or permission to use land for the purpose 
of erecting or maintaining a sign, or both, is granted by the owner to 
another person for a specified period of time. 
[(44)]£L5J "Legal copy" means the advertising copy on the sign 
that occupies at least 50% of the sign size. 
[(45)](T6) "Nonconforming Sign" means a sign that was 
lawfully erected, but that does not conform to State law or rules 
passed or made at a later date or that later fails to comply with State 
legislation or rules because of changed conditions. The term 
"illegally erected" or "illegally maintained" is not synonymous with 
the term, "nonconforming sign", nor is a sign with "grandfather" 
status synonymous with the term, "nonconforming sign." 
[fM>V|(T7) "Off-Premise Sign" means also, in supplement to tlie 
definition stated in the Act, an outdoor advertising sign that 
advertises an activity, service or product and that is located on 
premises other than the premises at which activity or service occurs 
or product is sold or manufactured. 
[fj^)](18) "On-Premise Sign", in supplement to the definition 
stated in the Act, does not include a sign that advertises a product or 
service that is only incidental to the principal activity or that brings 
rental income to the property owner or occupant. [ 
(18) "Out of Standard" means any sign that fails to meet the 
standards and criteria set forth in the Utah Federal Agreement of 
January 18, 1968 as referenced in the Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Controls and Rules, current edition, or more restrictive statutes or 
rules passed after as to size, height, lighting, or spacing.] 
(19) "Parkland" means any publicly owned land that is 
designed or used as a public park, recreation area, wildlife or 
waterfowl refuge, or historical site. 
(20) "Property" as used in the definition of "On-Premise Sign" 
includes those areas from which the general public is serviced and 
which are directly connected with and are involved in assembling, 
manufacturing, servicing, repairing, or storing of products used in 
the business activity. This property does not include the site of any 
auxiliary facilities that are not essential to and customarily used in 
the conduct of business, nor does it include property not contiguous 
to the property on which the sign is situated. 
(21) "Sale or Lease Sign" means any sign situated on the 
subject property that advertises that the property is for "sale" or 
"lease". This sign may not advertise any product or service 
unrelated to the business of selling or leasing the land upon which it 
is located, nor may it advertise a projected use of the land or a 
financing service available or being utilized in its development. 
(22) "Scenic Area" as used in the Act includes a scenic byway. 
(23) "Transient or Temporary Activity" means any industrial 
or commercial activity, not otherwise herein excluded, that does not 
have a prior continuous history for a period of six months. 
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23 CFR § 750.707 
23 C.F.R. § 750.707 
c 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
TITLE 23-HIGHWAYS 
CHAPTER I-FEDERAL HIGHWAY 
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION 
SUBCHAPTER H-RIGHT-OF-WAY AND 
ENVIRONMENT 
PART 750-HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION 
SUBPART G-OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
CONTROL 
Current through June 16, 2004; 69 FR 33774 
§ 750.707 Nonconforming signs. 
(a) General. The provisions of § 750.707 apply to 
nonconfonriing signs which must be removed under 
State laws and regulations implementing 23U.S.C. 131. 
These provisions also apply to nonconforming signs 
located in commercial and industrial areas within 660 
feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way which come 
under the so-called grandfather clause contained in 
State-Federal agreements. These provisions do not 
apply to conforming signs regardless of when or where 
they are erected. 
(b) Nonconforming Signs. A nonconforming sign is a 
sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply 
with the provisions of State law or State regulations 
passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State 
law or State regulations due to changed conditions. 
Changed conditions include, for example, signs 
lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a 
later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully 
erected on a secondary highway later classified as a 
primary highway. 
(c) Grandfather Clause. At the option of the State, the 
agreement may contain a grandfather clause under 
which criteria relative to size, lighting, and spacing of 
signs in zoned and unzoned commercial and industrial 
areas within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the 
right-of-way apply only to new signs to be erected after 
the date specified in the agreement. Any sign lawfully 
in existence in a commercial or industrial area on such 
date may remain even though it may not comply with 
the size, lighting, or spacing criteria. This clause only 
allows an individual sign at its particular location for 
the duration of its normal life subject to customary 
maintenance. Preexisting signs covered by a 
grandfather clause, which do not comply with the 
agreement criteria have the status of nonconforming 
signs. 
(d) Maintenance and Continuance. In order to 
maintain and continue a nonconforming sign, the 
following conditions apply: 
(1) The sign must have been actually in existence at the 
time the applicable State law or regulations became 
effective as distinguished from a contemplated use such 
as a lease or agreement with the property owner. There 
are two exceptions to actual existence as follows: 
(i) Where a permit or similar specific State 
governmental action was granted for the construction of 
a sign prior to the effective date of the State law or 
regulations and the sign owner acted in good faith and 
expended sums in reliance thereon. This exception 
shall not apply in instances where large numbers of 
permits were applied for and issued to a single sign 
owner, obviously in anticipation of the passage of a 
State control law. 
(ii) Where the State outdoor advertising control law or 
the Federal-State agreement provides that signs in 
commercial and industrial areas may be erected within 
six (6) months after the effective date of the law or 
agreement provided a lease dated prior to such effective 
date was filed with the State and recorded within thirty 
(30) days following such effective date. 
(2) There must be existing property rights in the sign 
affected by the State law or regulations. For example, 
paper signs nailed to trees, abandoned signs and the like 
are not protected. 
(3) The sign may be sold, leased, or otherwise 
transferred without affecting its status, but its location 
may not be changed. A nonconforming sign removed 
as a result of a right-of-way taking or for any other 
reason may be relocated to a conforming area but 
cannot be reestablished at a new location as a 
nonconforming use. 
(4) The sign must have been lawful on the effective 
date of the State law or regulations, and must continue 
to be lawfully maintained. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
(5) The sign must remain substantially the same as it 
was on the effective date of the State law or regulations. 
Reasonable repair and maintenance of the sign, 
including a change of advertising message, is not a 
change which would terminate nonconforming rights. 
Each State shall develop its own criteria to determine 
when customary maintenance ceases and a substantial 
change has occurred which would terminate 
nonconforming rights. 
(6) The sign may continue as long as it is not 
destroyed, abandoned, or discontinued. If permitted by 
State law and reerected in kind, exception may be made 
for signs destroyed due to vandalism and other criminal 
or tortious acts. 
(i) Each state shall develop criteria to define 
destruction, abandonment and discontinuance. These 
criteria may provide that a sign which for a designated 
period of time has obsolete advertising matter or is 
without advertising matter or is in need of substantial 
repair may constitute abandonment or discontinuance. 
Similarly, a sign damaged in excess of a certain 
percentage of its replacement cost may be considered 
destroyed. 
(ii) Where an existing nonconforming sign ceases to 
display advertising matter, a reasonable period of time 
to replace advertising content must be established by 
each State. Where new content is not put on a structure 
within the established period, the use of the structure as 
a nonconforming outdoor advertising sign is terminated 
and shall constitute an abandonment or discontinuance. 
Where a State establishes a period of more than one (1) 
year as a reasonable period for change of message, it 
shall justify that period as a customary enforcement 
practice within the State. This established period may 
be waived for an involuntary discontinuance such as the 
closing of a highway for repair in front of the sign. 
(e) Just Compensation. The States are required to pay 
just compensation for the removal of nonconforming 
lawfully existing signs in accordance with the terms of 
23 U.S.C. 131 and the provisions of Subpart D, Part 
750, Chapter I, 23 CFR. The conditions which 
establish a right to maintain a nonconforming sign and 
therefore the right to compensation must pertain at the 
time it is acquired or removed. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, 
or Tables> 
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2767 Industrial Drive 
P.O. Box 1880 
Ogden, Utah 84402-1880 
David Miles, Hearing Officer 
Utah Department of Transportation 
4501 S.2700W. 
Box 141260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1260 
RE: Appeal of Departmental Action 
UDOT File No. 02-1-3 
R-407 Outdoor Advertising Application at MP 369.8 on Wayne Belleau Property 
Dear Mr. Miles: 
This is to follow up our telephone discussion on October 6. It is our understanding that 
you are the hearing officer for the aforementioned appeal. The appeal was filed on 
September 5, and it was our understanding that the procedure involves the department 
sending us a letter advising us of the briefing schedule for the appeal. You had indicated 
that Mark Burns with the Attorney General's Office would get that letter out to us right 
away, yet we have not received it. 
You may recall that this appeal involves an outdoor advertising structure that we are 
seeking to relocate, and which has been removed. Accordingly, we are not receiving the 
advertising income to which we are entitled, and are unable to meet our commitments to 
advertisers during the delay. In order to avoid any further delay, we wanted to get before 
you an analysis of the state regulations, and how they apply in this appeal. We also 
discussed that, in view of the issues involved and to facilitate your review of the oversize 
exhibits we have in support of this appeal, we have Requested an informal hearing with 
you on the appeal. 
The analysis of the issues on appeal are as follows: 
This is an appeal from the August 15, 2002 decision by Luana Middleton denying our 
permit application for relocation of an outdoor advertising sign on the above-referenced 
property. 
Historical Background 
The subject sign has existed since 1978. Several significant developments have occurred 
since the sign was erected that mandate its relocation. First, overhead electrical utility 
high power lines were installed in very close proximity to the sign well after the sign was 
erected. The power lines have created a risk of electrocution to our workers who change 
sign faces and perform maintenance on the subject sign periodically, and we have had to 
exercise great caution to deal with this situation. In a similar circumstance some time 
ago, our company had a worker electrocuted who was working on an outdoor advertising 
structure, so we are highly sensitive to such situations as they effect our employees. 
During the last session, and with UDOT's recognition that the risk of electrocution was 
significant, the Legislature passed a new law, S.B.145, to permit outdoor advertising 
companies to relocate signs closer to utility lines than applicable electrical codes would 
permit. This amendment to Section 72-7-516 was signed into law by the Governor in 
March, 2002. 
Another relevant factor is the on-ramp configuration for the northbound on-ramp and 
acceleration lane adjacent to the existing sign location. The on-ramp was configured 
differently when the sign was erected. It merged into the freeway at a much more 
dramatic angle than it does now, impairing the ability of vehicles to get up to speed 
before being forced into a merge. In response to this problem, the on-ramp was 
reconfigured to angle more parallel to the through lanes before merging, allowing more 
space for acceleration before the merge into the northbound through lanes. The on-ramp 
now has an acceleration lane that slowly merges into the outer lane. From the point that 
the pavement for the main-traveled way widens to merge with the pavement for the on-
ramp/acceleration lane, the incoming lane takes a full 1,773 feet until the pavement 
widening gradually ends. 
In our efforts to relocate the subject sign to maintain the required separation from the 
utility lines, we discussed relocation sites with the owner of the land. The property 
owner made us aware that it was pursuing development on its land, such that the sign 
would have to be moved to the north end of the site. Accordingly, we filed the 
appropriate application forms with UDOT. 
The Region One Permits Officer has misinterpreted the relevant state statutes and 
administrative rules to arrive at the conclusion that the proposed relocation site does not 
meet the spacing requirements from the interchange. In so doing, the denial of our permit 
request put us in the position of losing our sign altogether, or risking electrocution of our 
workers. It is clear that neither such result was the intent of the Legislature. The 
relocation site is a permitted one under the relevant statutes and rules. To accommodate 
the property owner, we are in the process of removing the existing sign. Accordingly, 
and following an inordinate delay in the processing of our permit request, we were forced 
to appeal this decision. 
Statutory Analysis 
The Permits Officer has interpreted the relocation site to be closer than permitted from 
the interchange, which she interprets to include all of the on-ramp/acceleration lane up to 
the point that the merging of the on-ramp/acceleration lane into the through lanes of the 
freeway ends. This is a misinterpretation of the statute and administrative rules. 
Submitted herewith is an aerial photograph diagramming the roadway and property 
conditions in the area, as well as the existing and proposed sign location, for your 
reference. See Exhibit 1. We have a full-size copy of this exhibit, and reiterate our 
request for the opportunity to present this exhibit to you at an informal hearing or a 
meeting of the parties. 
Section 72-7-505(3)( c)(i)(A) provides that outdoor advertising signs may not be located 
on an interstate highway "within 500 feet of an interchange". Ms. Middleton has 
explained to us that she interprets the rule to prohibit any outdoor advertising until a point 
500 feet beyond where the pavement widening for the on-ramp/acceleration lane ends. In 
doing so, Ms. Middleton has effectively interpreted the on-ramp/acceleration lane, in its 
entirety, to be part of the "interchange". This is in error. The statute defines an 
"interchange", in relevant part, as follows: 
"Interchange or intersection" means those areas and their approaches 
where traffic is channeled off or onto an interstate route, excluding the 
deacceleration lanes, acceleration lanes, ... 
(emphasis added). Id., Section 72-7-502(9). The term "acceleration lane" is not defined 
in the statute, but it is in the rule. R933-2-3(2) defines an acceleration lane as follows: 
(2) "Acceleration and deceleration lanes" means speed change lanes 
created for the purpose of enabling a vehicle to increase its speed to merge 
into, or out of, traffic on the main-traveled way. As used in the Act, an 
acceleration lane begins and ends at a point no closer than 500 feet from 
the nearest point of the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the 
exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way. 
(emphasis added). Clearly, under the regulatory scheme, the acceleration lane cannot be 
considered to be part of the "interchange". The crux of the issue is whether the 
acceleration lane is measured 500 feet from the "point of beginning" of the pavement 
widening, or the "point of ending". If it is the former, the proposed relocation site is a 
permitted location. If it is the latter, it is not. However, the latter would lead to an absurd 
result. 
If the point of measurement were interpreted to be the point that the pavement widening 
for the on-ramp/acceleration lane ends, the acceleration lane could not begin (under the 
foregoing definition in the Rule) until a point 500 feet beyond where it ends. This 
interpretation would render the Rule definition for an "acceleration lane" to be 
meaningless, and nonsense. The point of measurement has to be considered to be the 
beginning point of pavement widening, not the point where the pavement widening ends. 
Under the statute, from the point of the beginning of pavement widening, the 
"interchange" only continues for another 500 feet, at which point the incoming lane 
becomes an "acceleration lane" under the language of the rule. From that point 
northward, it may not be considered to be part of the "interchange" under the statutory 
definition. 
The "point of widening" is identified on the attached Exhibit 1 and depicted in the photos 
attached as Exhibit 2, and is located 1164 feet from the center line of Antelope Drive 
where it intersects with the freeway. From the beginning point of widening, the 
"acceleration lane" begins, and the "interchange" ends, 500 feet to the north. See Exhibit 
1. The statute provides that no outdoor advertising may be erected within 500 feet of the 
"interchange", effectively setting up a sign-free zone for the first 500 feet after the 
"interchange" ends. Both the existing sign, and the relocation site, are well outside of the 
sign-free zone. See Exhibit 1. 
In summary, the relocation site is a permitted location for an outdoor advertising 
structure, being located in excess of 500 feet from the "interchange". We respectfully 
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EXHIBIT 1 
Photo 1 Point of Widening (beginning) - aerial photo 
Photo 2 Point of Widening (beginning) - ground level photo 
Photo 3 Point of Widening (ending) - aerial photo 
Photo 4 Point of Widening (ending) - ground level photo 
Photo 5 Existing on-premise signs in area 
Photo 6 Existing on-premise monument sign 
Photo 7 Existing sign - prior to relocation 
Photo 8 Relocation site 
Area Photographs 
EXHIBIT 2 




